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Tax Reforms and Intertemporal Shifting of Wage Income: 
Evidence from Danish Monthly Payroll Records†
By Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Søren  Leth-Petersen, 
and Peer Ebbesen Skov*
This paper uses monthly payroll records for all Danish employees 
to identify widespread intertemporal shifting of labor income in 
response to a tax reform that significantly reduced the marginal tax 
rates for  one-fourth of all employees. When ignoring shifting, the 
estimate of the overall elasticity of taxable income equals 0.1, and 
the elasticity is increasing with earnings. When removing the shift-
ing component, the elasticity is close to zero at all earnings levels. 
The evidence also indicates that tax salience, liquidity constraints 
and firm willingness to cooperate in shifting are important factors in 
explaining shifting behavior. (JEL H24, H31, J22, J31)
This paper provides clear empirical evidence of large, widespread intertempo-ral shifting responses in wage income. Intertemporal shifting of wage income 
takes place when income earned in one tax year is paid out in another tax year, so 
as to reduce the tax payment of the individual. The incentive to do so is present 
whenever marginal tax rates vary over time, for example, because of changes in indi-
vidual circumstances (retirement, marriage, promotion, etc.), because of sunset pro-
visions that automatically change marginal tax rates at some specified future date, 
or because of reforms that change the tax system from one year to the next year.1 
Knowledge of intertemporal shifting behavior is therefore relevant for evaluating 
the revenue implications of tax reforms and the efficiency loss and distributional 
impact of the tax system.
1 A recent example of a sunset provision is the American Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2001 that lowered the top marginal tax rate from 39.6 percent to 35 percent but introduced a clause stating that 
the tax cut would expire by 2011. After a two-year extension of the tax cut in 2010, the American Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 2012 returned the top marginal tax rate to its 2001 level of 39.6 percent. The Congressional Budget Office 
(2013) projects that 2013 tax revenue decreases because of shifting of income from calendar year 2013 into late 
2012 in anticipation of the higher 2013 tax rate. 
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Our empirical analysis is based on new Danish administrative records with 
monthly information about wages and salaries of all employees, allowing us to 
identify intertemporal income shifting in a way not possible with data measured 
at the annual frequency. The identifying variation is provided by a large tax reform 
in Denmark, which reduced the highest marginal tax rate on earnings from 63 per-
cent to 56 percent, thereby significantly changing incentives for the one-fourth of 
 full-time employees with the highest incomes. The reform was passed in parliament 
at the end of May 2009 and changed the tax scheme from 2010 onward, thereby cre-
ating an incentive for  high-wage earners to postpone wage payments from the end 
of 2009 to the beginning of 2010. This type of income shifting requires the cooper-
ation of the employer, who reports the earnings to the tax authorities, but is possible 
without coming into conflict with the tax law. The shifting behavior studied here is 
therefore a classic example of tax avoidance. This is in contrast to, for example, the 
United States, where such activity is not legal and would therefore be classified as 
tax evasion.
Our analysis starts with graphical evidence revealing income shifting taking 
place around the implementation of the tax reform. We observe a clear negative 
spike in reported earnings of  high-income individuals in the last months of 2009 
and a positive spike in the beginning of 2010, and at the individual level we detect 
taxpayers with a significant drop in reported earnings at the end of 2009 followed 
by a jump in the beginning of 2010. We detect no systematic effects in other months 
or for a group of  middle-income individuals with only negligible changes in incen-
tives, confirming that the observed pattern is driven by income shifting. We obtain 
the same picture after controlling for a large number of covariates and also when 
looking across industry sectors, showing that shifting behavior is a widespread 
phenomenon.
Considering all the individuals with an incentive to shift income, we find that the 
average level of reported wage income is nearly 10 percent higher in January 2010 
and correspondingly lower in November and December 2009, revealing large shift-
ing effects even at the macro level. The share of income shifted is steadily increasing 
with income. On average, individuals in percentiles  95–99 shifted 15 percent of the 
average monthly wage income around New Year 2010, and for the top 1 percent of 
wage earners it was close to 30 percent.
Knowledge of intertemporal shifting behavior is relevant for the burgeoning lit-
erature, recently surveyed by Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012), that exploits tax 
reforms to identify the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) used to quantify the wel-
fare loss from taxation. It is  well-known that  short-run income shifting responses 
around the implementation of tax reforms may cause the estimate of the ( short-run) 
ETI to differ from the ( long-run) elasticity relevant for evaluating the distortionary 
effects of taxation (e.g., Slemrod 1998).
When we run a simple  difference-in-differences estimation on annual earnings 
before and after the reform, we find an overall ETI of around 0.1. The estimated 
ETI is increasing as a function of income from 0 for individuals with the lowest 
income levels within the treatment group to 0.25 for the taxpayers in the top 1 per-
cent of the income distribution. We show in different ways, for example, by exclud-
ing December and January observations, that these ETI estimates are almost entirely 
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due to income shifting responses. After removing the shifting component,  short-run 
elasticities are close to zero at all earnings levels.
The large income shifting response at the aggregate level is concentrated on a 
few taxpayers. Among the employees with an incentive to shift income, we find 
less than 5 percent exploit the opportunity to shift income, but that these individ-
uals shift large amounts. This observed pattern in reported earnings is difficult to 
reconcile with intertemporal changes in the timing of work, indicating the observed 
movements in income are due to tax avoidance rather than real responses (Slemrod 
1995). Moreover, the conclusion concerning bias in ETI estimates from temporary 
variation in income is independent of whether the temporary variation is due to tax 
avoidance or due to real responses.
The low share of employees engaging in shifting activity may seem surprising 
but is consistent with other types of evidence showing taxpayers engage less in tax 
avoidance than what is predicted by a standard economic model (Andreoni, Erard, 
and Feinstein 1998). There may be different reasons why an employee does not 
engage in intertemporal income shifting. First, we find that shifting is negligible 
among government employees, is more common in small private firms than in large 
firms, and is much more common among the  top-five earners within a firm. This 
may suggest that some employers are less willing to participate in tax avoidance 
due to the risk of bad publicity, which limits income shifting to small/medium sized 
private firms and top management. Second, we find that shifting is less pronounced 
for individuals with a low level of liquid assets relative to income, consistent with 
the explanation that liquidity constraints prevent some tax taxpayers from shifting 
income forward.
Third, by conducting a telephone survey of a randomly selected group of indi-
viduals and combining their responses with the register data, we show taxpayer 
information and attention are important, in line with recent studies of other types of 
behavioral responses to taxation (Chetty, Loony, and Kroft 2009; Chetty, Friedman, 
and Saez 2013). Among the survey respondents with an incentive to shift income 
only one out of five is aware of the tax incentive and know it is legal to shift the 
wage payments. The results further indicate that income shifting is concentrated 
among those who are informed in the treatment group but, on the other hand, less 
than 10 percent of the informed individuals actually engage in shifting. To conclude, 
the results do not point to a single explanation but rather to several reasons that com-
plement each other in explaining why some employees engage in shifting activities 
while others do not.
Previous studies of intertemporal income shifting have looked at annual income 
data or aggregate data. Goolsbee (2000) looks at intertemporal income shifting of 
the five  highest-paid employees in US public companies in response to the mar-
ginal tax rate increase implemented by President Clinton in 1993. He applies a 
standard  difference-in-differences setup on annual income but allows  tax-reform 
variation across treatment and control groups to affect income already in the year 
before the reform in order to detect income shifting. The results indicate that most 
of the variation in taxable income of these very highly paid individuals seems to 
be driven by retiming in the realization of stock options, implying that most of the 
ETI is driven by intertemporal income shifting rather than by permanent income 
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responses. He finds little responsiveness of salary and bonuses to the tax hike. This 
is in contrast to Sammartino and Weiner (1997), who find evidence in aggregate 
data of  time-adjustments in bonuses due to the 1993 US tax reform. A reason for 
this discrepancy may be that it is easier and more valuable for top executives to 
change the timing of the realization of stock options rather than bonuses, while 
other  high-income individuals, who do not have stock options, instead focus their 
effort on shifting bonuses and regular wage and salary payments. Our results pro-
vide some support for this conjecture as our income measure only includes wage 
income, implying the shifting behavior documented in our study is not related to the 
realization of stock options.
Heim (2009) uses a similar approach as Goolsbee but without detecting signif-
icant intertemporal effects in income responses to the US tax reforms in 2001 and 
2003, while Giertz (2010) finds evidence of intertemporal shifting effects in response 
to the US tax reforms in the 1990s. Compared to these studies, based on annual 
income, the monthly frequency of our data offers a unique possibility to obtain a 
more precise empirical identification of intertemporal income shifting responses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the 
Danish 2010 tax reform, the data sources, and our approach to identify income shift-
ing behavior. Section II describes the empirical results on income shifting, while 
Section III analyzes how much of the elasticity of taxable income may be attributed 
to temporary income shifting behavior. Finally, Section IV concludes.
I. Description of Policy, Data, and Identification Approach
The analysis is based on the Danish 2010 tax reform that significantly reduced the 
taxation of labor income with the declared goal of stimulating labor supply. The tax 
cut on labor income was financed by decreasing the value of deductions (including 
interest payments), reducing business subsidies, and increasing energy and envi-
ronmental taxes, thereby keeping government revenue constant (before behavioral 
responses). The reform was proposed on March  1,  2009 , passed in the Danish par-
liament on May  28 the same year, and signed into law taking effect from January  1, 
2010 . As is usually the case with tax reforms, the distance between the proposal/
decision and the actual implementation gave taxpayers an opportunity to save taxes 
by shifting income across the two tax years.
The reform mainly reduced marginal tax rates on labor income for  high-wage 
earners. Table 1 displays the different taxes applying to labor income in Denmark 
before and after the reform. It consists of  so-called labor market contribution, a 
regional tax, a church tax and a bottom tax, which apply to all income above a small 
standard deduction and give in total a marginal tax rate on labor income of 43.5 per-
cent in 2009 (column 1). In addition to these taxes,  high-wage earners with income 
above a cutoff of 377,000 Danish kroner (DKK) in 2009 have to pay a middle tax 
and a top tax implying that they face a marginal tax rate of 62.8 percent (column 2).2
2 With an exchange rate of 6 DKK per US dollar, the middle/top tax cutoff of DKK 377,000 corresponds to 
around US$63,000. 
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The tax reform abolished the middle tax bracket altogether and reduced the 
bottom tax rate a little, implying that the marginal tax rate for  high-wage earners 
 ( τ H ) dropped to 56.0 percent in 2010 (column 4), equivalent to an increase in the 
 net-of-tax rate,  1 −  τ H , of 18 percent. For comparison, individuals with income just 
below the middle/top tax cutoff faced a marginal tax rate of 42.2 percent after the 
reform (column 3), corresponding to an increase in the  net-of-tax rate,  1 −  τ L , of 
only 2 percent.
The incentive to shift income was also influenced by a change in the middle/
top tax income cutoff, which was increased from DKK 377,000 to DKK 424,000 
as shown in Table 1. Figure 1 shows how the incentive to shift one month’s salary 
from 2009 to 2010 varies with the (average) monthly level of gross taxable earnings 
and salaries in 2009. The left panel shows the gain measured in DKK and the right 
panel shows the gain measured in proportion to the monthly  net-of-tax earnings. For 
individuals with monthly incomes below DKK 32,000, the gain from shifting is very 
small (less than DKK 1,000). It then increases with earnings due to the change in the 
middle/top tax cutoff, and for people with monthly earnings above DKK 35,000, the 
incentive is constant at 7 percent of the amount shifted (the slope in panel A), giv-
ing a sizable economic gain corresponding to 18 percent of the monthly  net-of-tax 
earnings (see panel B). Note that the changes displayed in panel B correspond to the 
changes in the  net-of-tax rate of 2 percent and 18 percent for individuals below and 
above, respectively, the top/middle tax  cut-off, with the exception of individuals in 
a small income range where the incentive is affected by the change in the middle/
top tax income cutoff.
It was possible to shift payments of income earned in the second half of 2009 
into 2010 without coming into conflict with the Danish tax law. According to the tax 
law, companies have to remit taxes on labor income at the time when income is paid 
out to the employees, and wages and salaries have to be paid out no later than six 
Table 1—Marginal Tax Rates on Labor Income
Year 2009 Year 2010
Labor income (LI) in 1,000 DKK: < 377 > 377 < 424 > 424
Tax Tax base Rate (%) Rate (%)  Rate (%) Rate (%)
Labor market contributions (LMC) LI 8 8 8 8
Regional tax (RT) LI × (1 − LMC) 32.8 32.8 32.8 32.8
Bottom tax bracket (BT) LI × (1 − LMC) 5.04 5.04 3.67 3.67
Middle tax bracket (MT) LI × (1 − LMC) 0 6 0 0
Top tax bracket (TT) LI × (1 − LMC) 0 15 0 15
Church tax (CT) LI × (1 − LMC) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Marginal tax rate on labor income  43.5 62.8  42.2 56.0
notes: The marginal tax rate equals LMC + (1 − LMC) × (RT + BT + MT + TT + CT). These computations 
of the marginal tax rates apply to the majority of taxpayers. The regional tax varies a little across municipalities. 
The top/middle tax cutoff depends also on the size of net capital income (excluding stock income) but only if it is 
positive, and the large majority of taxpayers have negative net capital income. We also disregard the possibility of 
transferring unutilized allowances between spouses when computing the middle tax, implying that some married 
persons with income in a certain range pay the top tax but not the middle tax.
source: Website of the Danish Ministry of Taxation (www.skm.dk)
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months after the income is earned.3 This gave workers an opportunity to save taxes 
legally if their employers would collaborate by postponing the payout of wages and 
salaries from 2009 to 2010. After the reform was passed, several articles appeared 
in the popular press describing the possibility of shifting earnings and discussing 
whether or not it was legal, and in  mid-October an official spokesperson from the 
Danish tax agency stated publicly that it was legal to postpone wage payments into 
2010.4
The empirical analysis is based on a new administrative register, known in 
Denmark as the eincome register, containing  third-party information about monthly 
wages and salaries for all employees. All firms in Denmark have to report wages and 
salaries for each employee to the tax agency (SKAT) and tax evasion on wage income 
is very small (Kleven et al. 2011). The new register has been in place since January 
2008 when the frequency of the reporting requirement was changed from yearly to 
monthly. The register contains the personal registration number of the employee and 
a firm identifier, which enable us to link the data to various background information 
of the individual and of the firm from other administrative  registers at Statistics 
3 This is stated in §46 part 1 and 2 in the Danish law on income taxation called Kildeskatteloven. See www.
retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=134306. 
4 The tax official was cited by the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten on October 13, 2009 (see www.epn.dk/
privat/article1849439.ece). 
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Figure 1. Incentive to Shift One Month’s Salary from 2009 to 2010
notes: The graphs show the increase in disposable income of a taxpayer who shifts wages and salaries earned in 
one month of 2009 to 2010 as a function of the monthly gross earnings in 2009 of the taxpayer. Panel A shows the 
amount saved in taxes, while panel B shows the amount in percent of the monthly net-of-tax earnings. It is assumed 
that the taxpayer has the same monthly earnings level in all months. The computations are based on a 2 percent 
growth rate in nominal wages from 2009 to 2010.
source: Author’s own calculations
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Denmark. We also link the register data to a small survey sample containing infor-
mation about taxpayer awareness of the opportunity to shift income.
Our dataset covers the period from January 2008 to December 2011 and con-
tains monthly information on all individuals who have been employed at some point 
during this period. Some of these individuals are children and other people with 
irregular earnings and temporary employment contracts. In the analysis, we focus 
on individuals who are employed throughout 2008, corresponding to having a wage 
record for every month, and who have positive income in all years.5 For these indi-
viduals, Figure 2 displays the distribution of the average monthly income in 2008. 
The median income level is approximately DKK 30,000, and around one-fourth of 
the full time employees have monthly earnings above DKK 35,000, where incen-
tives to shift income are  nonnegligible.
In order to identify intertemporal shifting behavior, we divide the sample into 
taxpayers with a strong incentive to shift income (treatment group) and taxpayers 
with only a negligible incentive (control group). This is done by allocating people 
to a tax bracket based on income in 2008, i.e., before the tax reform could have 
impacted their income. We define the treatment group ( T-group) as the employees 
in the private sector with monthly gross earnings above DKK 35,000 in 2008, which 
is percentile 75 in Figure 2, and define the control group ( C-group) as those having 
monthly income in the range DKK 30, 000–35,000. This leaves us with 328,679 
individuals out of which 219,179 belong to the treatment group.
For each individual, we compute the percentage change in the monthly wage 
relative to the wage level in 2008,
(1)  w y, m, i =   z y, m, i −  z 2008, m, i   ____________ z ̅2008, i  ,  
where  y denotes the year,  m denotes the month,  i denotes the individual, and  z ̅2008, i 
denotes the average monthly gross earnings of individual  i in 2008. We compute 
percentage changes instead of using a  log-transformation because earnings may be 
zero or close to zero in some months, for example due to income shifting.
Shifting behavior is characterized by an unusually low income growth rate in 
the months leading up to the implementation of the reform and an unusually high 
income growth afterwards. These effects may be detected—assuming a common 
wage growth rate in absence of the reform—by comparing the growth rates in the 
months around implementation of the reform to other months and by comparing 
income growth patterns of the  T-group relative to the  C-group,
(2)  w y, m =  1 _  n T  ∑ i∈T  w y, m, i −  1 _  n c  ∑ i∈c  w y, m, i ,  
5 We do not analyse intertemporal income shifting of  the self-employed, which has recently been studied by le 
Marie and Schjerning (2013). Our sample includes individuals who are both wage earners and  self-employed at the 
same time. Removing  self-employed completely from the sample has only negligible effects on the results. 
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where  T denotes the treatment group,  c denotes the control group, and  n denotes the 
number of individuals in each of the groups.
Using formula (2), it is possible to obtain an estimate of the average income share 
shifted from 2009 to 2010, but the identification strategy does not fully exploit that 
intertemporal shifting behavior generates both a decrease in the observed income 
before the reform and an increase in income after the reform at the individual level. 
By exploiting this characteristic of shifting behavior, we may obtain a stronger iden-
tification of taxpayers engaging in shifting activity. Specifically, we construct the 
following shifting indicator dummy variable for each individual and each month
(3)  D y, m, i =  { 1 if  w y, m, i > 50 % and  w y, m−1, i < −50 %    0 otherwise . 
The indicator equals one if income in a month is high compared to its (counterfac-
tual) level in the same month of 2008 and income in the preceding month is low 
compared to its level in the same month of 2008. The shifting indicator is equal to 
one in January 2010 for an individual who defers his payment of regular earnings 
from December 2009 to January 2010 and an individual that normally receives a 
bonus in December but postpones the December 2009 bonus to January 2010 in 
order to save taxes. The shifting indicator may also equal one due to large  random 
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Figure 2. Wage Distribution of Full-Time Employees
notes: The figure shows the distribution of average monthly 2008 wage income of all full-time employees. The top 
tax bracket starts around the income level of the seventy-fifth percentile. The distribution is truncated at percentile 
1 and percentile 99.
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
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income movements at the individual level, but the average value of the shifting 
indicator at all other months may be used to evaluate the importance of this effect 
because, by construction, December 2009 to January 2010 is the only consecutive 
bimonthly period where  tax-motivated shifting of income can take place. Note, 
finally, that this identification strategy is not very sensitive to differences in income 
trends across treatment and control groups, as is the case for the measure based on 
(2) and for studies of intertemporal shifting based on annual observations (Goolsbee 
2000, Heim 2009, Giertz 2010).
II. Results
This section presents the empirical evidence of shifting behavior. First, we esti-
mate the average share of income shifted and the share of individuals engaging in 
shifting activity. Then, we explore how shifting activity varies across different indi-
vidual characteristics. Finally, we present survey evidence on the role of information 
and awareness.
A. main results
Panel A of Figure 3 shows the average monthly wage income from January 2008 
to January 2011 of the  T-group and the  C-group, respectively. It reveals systematic 
seasonal variation in wages over time for both groups with high average wage income 
in April and December and low average wage income in the winter and in the fall. 
More importantly, the graph uncovers important differences around New Year 2010 
across the two groups. The income in December 2009 for the  T-group is below the 
annual average of the group for 2009, and income increases from December 2009 
to January 2010. This is in contrast to both the year before and the year after where 
the December income of the  T-group is above the annual average, and where income 
decreases from December to January. The December 2009–January 2010 income 
pattern of the  T-group is also in stark contrast to the pattern of the  C-group where 
the December wage income level is clearly above the annual average and where the 
monthly income decreases from December to January. Moreover, this opposite pat-
tern of the control group is observed across all three years. Overall, these observed 
income patterns are consistent with the  T-group shifting income from 2009 to 2010 
as a result of the 2010 tax reform.
Panel B of Figure 3 shows the growth rate of wages of the  T-group relative to the 
 C-group for each month estimated using formula (2). By definition, the estimates 
are zero in the baseline months of 2008. In 2009, it fluctuates around zero before it 
drops in November and December of 2009, the last two months before the imple-
mentation of the tax reform. It then increases sharply just after implementation of 
the reform, and finally drops to a lower level in the remaining months of 2010. The 
wage income of the  T-group is 3 percent and 5 percent below its counterfactual 
levels in the two months leading up to the reform, and 9 percent above in January 
2010. These differences are highly significant with a 95 percent confidence interval 
of  (−5.0 percent, −4.2 percent) for December 2009 and  (8.7 percent, 9.6 percent) 
for January 2010.
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Figure 3 indicates that income shifting takes place, but it is also evident that the 
data exhibit some noise. There are, for example, positive spikes in April, August, 
and October of 2010, but note that these spikes are not systematically preceded by 
negative spikes in the previous months, which is a characteristic of intertemporal 
shifting. These variations can arise for many reasons, for example, because of dif-
ferences in the level and timing of bonus payments across the treatment and control 
groups.
In Figure 4, we repeat the analysis, but this time using the shifting indicator defined 
in (3). Panel A plots the average value of the shifting indicator for the  T-group and 
 C-group across the observation period. There is a clear spike in January 2010 for 
the  T-group, and movements are otherwise relatively small for both the  T-group and 
the  C-group. Panel B plots the difference between the two groups. It clearly shows 
how income shifting takes place around New Year 2010 when compared to any other 
month, including January 2011. The size of the spike in panel B is 2.7 percent with a 
95 percent confidence interval of (2.6 percent, 2.8 percent). Thus, according to this 
estimate about 3 percent of the taxpayers in the top tax bracket engage in shifting 
behavior.6 If, in addition, we impose the criteria that November 2009 income is 
6 The 50  percent–50 percent  cut-off criteria defining shifting behavior is somewhat arbitrarily chosen, and we 
have therefore also experimented with a 25  percent–25 percent criteria and a 75  percent–75 percent criteria. This 
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Figure 3. Monthly Wages and Income Shifted
notes: Panel A shows the monthly wage income of the T-group and the C-group. The T-group consists of all private 
sector employees with average monthly wage income above DKK 35,000 in 2008 and positive wage income in 2009 
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source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
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unusual low (50 percent) compared to November 2008, then the result indicates that 
around 1.5 percent of the taxpayers in the  T-group shift income from both November 
and December. Finally, if we extend the period of the analysis to October 2009, then 
it indicates that only around 0.4 percent of the taxpayers shift income from the three 
months leading up to the reform.
B. results by Different groups
The finding that shifting activity is concentrated among a small group of employ-
ees is consistent with other types of evidence showing that taxpayers engage less 
in tax avoidance than what is predicted by a standard economic model (Andreoni, 
gives similar results, although the number of shifters varies a little across the different criteria. With a 25  percent– 
25 percent criteria, the share of shifters becomes 3.0 percent, while it becomes 1.9 percent with a 75  percent–75 per-
cent criteria. Another concern is whether the results are affected by changes in bonus patterns and in exit rates from 
the labor market due to the financial crisis during this period. In a sensitivity analysis, we have restricted the sample 
to employees without any exit to unemployment during 2009 and 2010. This did not have any significant effect on 
the results. Some employees may not have received a bonus, that they would otherwise have received, because of 
the crisis. This may imply that we underestimate the degree of income shifting in a normal business cycle situation. 
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Figure 4. Share of Employees Shifting Income
notes: The shifting indicator is constructed separately for all months and equals 1 if the income of the employee 
in that month is at least 50 percent above the average monthly income level in 2008 and income in the preceding 
month is at least 50 percent below the 2008 average income level, see formula (3). Panel A shows, for each month, 
the share of employees with a shifting indicator equal to one across treatment status. Panel B shows the difference 
in the share of employees with a shifting indicator equal to one between the T-group and the C-group, where the size 
of this difference in January 2010 is taken as an approximation of the share of income shifters. The construction of 
the T-group and the C-group is described in the note to Figure 3.
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
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Erard, and Feinstein 1998). In this subsection, we analyze whether the shifting 
activity is concentrated on certain types of individuals, and how it is related to char-
acteristics of employees and employers that might be expected to be important.
We start by looking at the degree of shifting across income groups. A conclusion 
from studies estimating the elasticity of taxable income is that income responses 
to taxation are larger at higher income levels (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012). 
In line with this conclusion, Figure 5 shows that shifting activity is increasing in 
income. The figure shows the share of individuals shifting in each of the income 
intervals [p80, p90), [p90, p95), [p95, p99), and [p99, p100], where “p” denotes the 
percentile in the overall income distribution illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 5 shows 
that shifting takes place across the entire distribution, but that the extent of shifting 
is increasing in the level of income. The share of shifters is  1–2 percent in the group 
with the lowest income, 3 percent in the second group, 5 percent in the third group, 
and close to 8 percent for the  top-1 percent highest paid employees.
In Figure A1 in the online Appendix, we analyze the share of income shifted 
for each of the four groups by repeating Figure 3 for each subgroup. It shows that 
the share of income shifted is steadily increasing in the income level with around 
5 percent of the average monthly wage income being shifted around New Year 2010 
for the first group, 10 percent in the second group, 15 percent in the third group, 
and close to 30 percent among the top earners. These estimates are striking as they 
only concern wage and salary income. People at the highest end of the income dis-
tribution may also receive payments in the form of stock options or other forms of 
compensation, cf. Goolsbee (2000), that we do not observe in our data.
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Figure 5. Share of Employees Shifting Income by Income Percentiles
notes: The figure shows the share of income shifters within different income segments of the 
treatment group. The black solid curve represents employees with average monthly earnings 
within the eightieth and ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution and so on. Each graph 
is constructed by computing the differences in the share of income shifters, according to the 
shifting indicator in formula (3), between the relevant income segment of the T-group and the 
C-group for each month.
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
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Table 2 displays shifting prevalence by industry. The table is constructed by 
decomposing all firms into ten industry groups and repeating the analysis in Figure 4 
for each group. The row labeled “all industries” shows that 2.7 percent of all tax-
payers in the treatment group are shifters, corresponding to the spike at January 
2010 in panel B of Figure 4. For each industry group, we obtain a graph similar 
to Figure 4 with a clear spike at January 2010, and the size of the spike is reported 
in Table 2. The results reveal that people shifting income are surprisingly equally 
spread out across the various industry groups, suggesting that shifting conditions, 
for example, the willingness of employers to cooperate about shifting, are similar 
across industries.7
In Figure 6, we analyze shifting behavior in the public sector. A natural presump-
tion is that public sector employers are less willing to cooperate in organizing tax 
avoidance. In line with this hypothesis, the evidence reveals no sign of any shifting 
activity taking place in the public sector. The curve is lying slightly above the  x-axis 
and is almost flat without any clear spike at January 2010.
It may be easier to organize shifting in a small firm than in a large firm, for exam-
ple, because a large firm may be more in the public eye and care more about its 
public reputation, or because the workers are closer to the  decision-making process 
in a small firm. In Figure 7, we split the sample by firm size. The graph displays 
the extent of shifting for individuals working in firms with less than 25 employees, 
with  25–99 employees, with  100–499 employees, and with 500 or more employees. 
7 The industry groups in Table 2 are relatively broad with many different kinds of firms within each group, so 
it is natural to expect some variation within each group. For example, accountants—a small subgroup within other 
business services—is a group likely to be well informed and capable of organizing income shifting. For this group, 
the fraction of shifters reaches 6 percent, twice the industry average of 3 percent. 
Table 2—Share of Employees Shifting Income by Industry Sector
Industry sector Percent 95% conf.
1. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 3.4 (0.9, 6.0)
2. Manufacturing, mining, quarrying, and utility services 2.6 (2.4, 2.7)
3. Construction 2.5 (2.1, 2.8)
4. Trade and transport, etc. 3.2 (3.1, 3.4)
5. Information and communication 2.4 (2.1, 2.7)
6. Financial and insurance 1.5 (1.2, 1.7)
7. Real estate 4.3 (3.1, 5.4)
8. Other business services and activity not stated 3.1 (2.8, 3.5)
9. Public administration, education, and health 2.1 (1.3, 2.9)
10. Arts, entertainment, and other services 2.6 (1.5, 3.7)
All sectors 2.7 (2.6, 2.8)
notes: The table reports the share of income shifters across industry types with 95 percent con-
fidence intervals in brackets. For each industry, the estimate measures the difference in the share 
of employees fulfilling the shifting criteria in formula (3) between the T-group and the C-group. 
The shifting indicator equals 1 if the income of the employee in January 2010 is at least 50 per-
cent above the average monthly income level in 2008 and income in December 2009 is at least 
50 percent below the 2008 average monthly income level. The construction of the T-group and 
the C-group is described in the note to Figure 3.
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
246 AmEricAn Economic JournAL: Economic PoLicy AugusT 2016
−1
0
1
2
3
4
Fe
b 
20
09
M
ar
 2
00
9
Ap
r 2
00
9
M
ay
 2
00
9
Ju
n 
20
09
Ju
l 2
00
9
Au
g 
20
09
Se
p 
20
09
Oc
t 2
00
9
No
v 2
00
9
De
c 2
00
9
Ja
n 
20
10
Fe
b 
20
10
M
ar
 2
01
0
Ap
r 2
01
0
M
ay
 2
01
0
Ju
n 
20
10
Ju
l 2
01
0
Au
g 
20
10
Se
p 
20
10
Oc
t 2
01
0
No
v 2
01
0
De
c 2
01
0
Ja
n 
20
11
P
er
ce
nt
Month
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Fe
b 
20
09
M
ar
 2
00
9
Ap
r 2
00
9
M
ay
 2
00
9
Ju
n 
20
09
Ju
l 2
00
9
Au
g 
20
09
Se
p 
20
09
Oc
t 2
00
9
No
v 2
00
9
De
c 2
00
9
Ja
n 
20
10
Fe
b 
20
10
M
ar
 2
01
0
Ap
r 2
01
0
M
ay
 2
01
0
Ju
n 
20
10
Ju
l 2
01
0
Au
g 
20
10
Se
p 
20
10
Oc
t 2
01
0
No
v 2
01
0
De
c 2
01
0
Ja
n 
20
11
P
er
ce
nt
Month
Employees [1,25]
Employees [26,100]
Employees [101,500]
Employees [501,+]
Figure 6. Share of Local Government Employees Shifting Income
notes: The graph shows the share of shifters in local government. The construction of the graph 
corresponds to panel B of Figure 4. The T-group (32,099 individuals) consists of local govern-
ment employees with an average monthly wage income above DKK 35,000 in 2008 and positive 
wage income in 2009 and 2010. The C-group (49,010 individuals) consists of local government 
employees with an average monthly wage income in the range DKK 30,000–35,000 in 2008 and 
positive wage income in 2009 and 2010.
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
Figure 7. Share of Employees Shifting Income by Firm Size
notes: The graph shows the share of shifters by firm size. The graph corresponds to panel B of 
Figure 4 and is constructed by splitting the full sample used in Figure 4 into four subsamples 
according to the number of employees. The black solid line is based on persons working in com-
panies with 1–25 employees, the grey line is based on persons working in firms with 26–100 
employees and so on.
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
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Shifting appears to be much more widespread among small firms where  5–6 percent 
are shifters according to the analysis. The share of shifters declines steadily as firm 
size increases, and for the largest firms, shifting only takes place for about 1 percent 
of the employees.
In Figure 8, we repeat the firm size stratification but confine our sample to include 
only the  top-five paid employees from each firm. That changes the picture. We still 
observe about 6 percent shifters among the small firms, but the share of shifters is 
now at the same level for larger firms. Thus, income shifting is a more prevalent 
phenomenon among the top management within each firm. This aligns with the 
findings of Goolsbee (2000) showing that income shifting is prevalent among the 
highest paid top executives in large US public companies. More importantly, our 
results show that shifting by top management in large companies only accounts for 
a limited part of the overall income shifting. If we remove the  top-5 paid employees 
in large companies (defined as more than 100 employees, the top decile measured 
by number of employees) from the sample, then the share of shifters changes from 
2.7 percent to 2.6 percent. Thus, shifting is not confined to the small elite of top 
managers in large firms.
The decision to engage in income shifting likely also depends on the financial 
capacity of the employee. Shifting a full month of income from December 2009 
to January 2010 requires financial resources enough to maintain living expenses in 
that month, or access to credit at a level of cost that does not exceed the gains from 
shifting. As a proxy for financial capacity of an employee, we compute the amount 
of financial assets, i.e., money in bank accounts and the value of shares and bonds, 
at the end of 2008, and measure it relative to annual disposable income in 2008. 
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Figure 8. Share of Top Five Wage Earners Shifting Income by Firm Size
notes: The graph shows the share of shifters among top five wage earners by firm size. The graph 
corresponds to Figure 7 with the exception that only top five wage earners within each firm are 
included in the analysis. 
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
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This is similar to the approach commonly applied in the consumption literature 
(e.g., Johnson, Parker, and Souledes 2006;  Leth-Petersen 2010). Figure 9 repeats 
the analysis in Figure 4 separately for individuals with a level of liquidity below one 
month of disposable income, between one and two months of disposable income, 
and above two months of disposable income. The spike at January 2010 is increas-
ing from 2.3 percent shifters in the group with low financial capacity to 3.0 percent 
in the group with high financial capacity, indicating that liquidity constraints have a 
role to play when employees decide whether or not to engage in shifting behavior.
So far we have provided evidence based on bivariate correlations of the shifting 
indicator with industry type workplace, firm size, top five paid employees within the 
firm, and financial capacity of the employees. In Table 3, we collect all these factors 
in a linear probability model by estimating
(4)  D i =  β 0 +  d i T β 1 +  x i  β 2 +  d i T ( x i −  x ̅i )  β 3 +  ε i ,  
where  D i is the shifting indicator in equation (3) measured in January 2010, 
 d i T is a dummy variable that equals one if the employee belongs to the  T-group, 
 x i is a vector of explanatory factors,  x ̅i is the sample mean of the explanatory vari-
ables, and  ε i is an error term. In this specification,  β 1 measures the overall share 
of individuals who are shifting income after controlling for observable differences 
between the treatment group and the control group, and  β 3 captures variation in the 
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Figure 9. Share of Employees Shifting Income by Liquidity Level
notes: The graph shows the share of individuals shifting income in the treatment group across 
employees with different levels of liquidity. The liquidity measure is constructed as the value 
in 2008 of stocks, bonds, and deposit accounts, and employees are divided into three groups 
depending on their level of liquidity relative to their average monthly net-of-tax wage level in 
2008. Each graph is constructed by computing the differences in the share of income shifters, 
according to the shifting indicator in formula (3), between the relevant liquidity segment of the 
T-group and the C-group for each month.
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT) and 
information on liquidity from administrative registers at Statistics Denmark
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share of shifters across observables around the mean effect (Wooldridge 2002). We 
include among the explanatory variables,  x , the factors studied in the partial analy-
ses described above as well as demographic and geographic control variables. The 
first conclusion from Table 3 is that the  β 1 -estimate of the average number of shifters 
Table 3—Income Shifter Characteristics 
 Coeff. Conf. 95%
T-group 2.5 (2.3, 2.6)
Sector 1: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing—omitted
Sector 2: Manufacturing, mining, quarrying, and utility services −0.2 (−1.6, 1.0)
Sector 3: Construction −0.4 (−1.8, 0.8)
Sector 4: Trade and transport, etc. −0.4 (−1.7, 0.8)
Sector 5: Information and communication −0.1 (1.5, 1.1)
Sector 6: Financial and insurance −0.7 (−2.1, 0.5)
Sector 7: Real estate 0.0 (−1.5, 1.4)
Sector 8: Other business services and activity not stated 0.4 (−1.0, 1.6)
Sector 9: Public administration, education, and health −0.2 (−1.7, 1.0)
Sector 10: Arts, entertainment, and other services −0.6 (−2.1, 0.7)
500 < Company employees—omitted
100 < Company employees ≤ 500 −0.0 (−0.2, 0.1)
25 < Company employees ≤ 100 0.4 (0.2, 0.5)
Company employees ≤ 25 0.6 (0.3, 0.9)
Company top 5 wage earner 0.2 (−0.1, 0.5)
Liquid assets less than one months net-of-tax wage payments—omitted
Liquid assets equal to 1–2 months net-of-tax wage payments 0.1 (−0.1, 0.2)
Liquid assets equal to 2+ months net-of-tax wage payments 0.3 (0.2, 0.4)
Tgrp × (sector 1 − m(sector 1))—omitted 
Tgrp × (sector 2 − m(sector 2)) 1.3 (−1.3, 3.7)
Tgrp × (sector 3 − m(sector 3)) 0.6 (−2.1, 3.0)
Tgrp × (sector 4 − m(sector 4)) 1.3 (−1.3, 3.7)
Tgrp × (sector 5 − m(sector 5)) 1.0 (−1.6, 3.5)
Tgrp × (sector 6 − m(sector 6)) 0.6 (−2.0, 3.1)
Tgrp × (sector 7 − m(sector 7)) 1.3 (−1.5, 3.8)
Tgrp × (sector 8 − m(sector 8)) 1.5 (−1.1, 4.1)
Tgrp × (sector 9 − m(sector 9)) 1.0 (−1.7, 3.4)
Tgrp × (sector 10 − m(sector 10)) 0.6 (−2.3, 3.2)
Tgrp × (Employees501 − m(Employees501))—omitted 
Tgrp × (101Employees500 − m(101Employees500)) 0.9 (0.7, 1.1)
Tgrp × (26Employees100 − m(26Employees100)) 1.3 (1.0, 1.6)
Tgrp × (Employees25 − m(Employees25)) 1.2 (0.7, 1.7)
Tgrp × (top5 − m(top5)) 3.5 (3.1, 4.0)
Tgrp × (liquidity of 1month − m(liquidity of 1month))—omitted
Tgrp × (liquidity of 1–2month − m(liquidity of 1–2month)) 0.7 (0.4, 1.0)
Tgrp × (liquidity of 2+month − m(liquidity of 2+month)) 1.1 (0.9, 1.3)
Additional controls X
Constant 1.3 (0.1, 2.7)
Observations 324.126
Notes: The table reports the estimates from the LPM specification in (4) and the 95 percent confidence intervals 
of these estimates. The confidence intervals are based on bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000 replications. The 
dependent variable is the shifting indicator in (3), which equals 1 if the income of the employee in January 2010 is 
at least 50 percent above the average monthly income level in 2008 and income in December 2009 is at least 50 per-
cent below the 2008 average monthly income level. The additional control variables include gender, age dummy 
variables, marital status and geographic location of residence, and m(·) denotes the mean of a variable. The con-
struction of the T-group and the C-group is described in the note to Figure 3.
Source: Monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT) and socioeconomic information 
from administrative registers at Statistics Denmark
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is almost unchanged compared to the baseline analysis in Figure 4: 2.5 percent of 
the employees shift income compared to 2.7 percent in the baseline analysis. The 
second conclusion is that all the results from the partial analysis also hold in the 
multivariate analysis. None of the  β 3 coefficients for industry types are significant, 
showing shifting is widespread in the economy rather than concentrated on a few 
sectors. The other estimates show that the share of shifters is higher in smaller firms, 
is higher among the five best paid employees within firms, and is higher among 
employees with  nonbinding liquidity constraints.
C. survey results
A reason why only a few individuals in the  T-group exploit the opportunity to 
shift income and save taxes could be that taxpayers are unaware of the possibility 
and of the potential benefits associated with shifting. As described in Section I, there 
were articles in the popular press describing the possibility of shifting income, and 
in  mid-October a tax official from the Danish tax agency stated publicly that it was 
legal to postpone wage payments into 2010.
In order to get a better understanding about the level of information and aware-
ness, we included two questions in a telephone survey of a random sample of indi-
viduals from the adult population in January 2011. The survey response rate was 
67 percent. The survey data was then merged at the individual level to the eincome 
register giving us a sample of 878 taxpayers with 588 individuals belonging to the 
 T-group and 290 individuals belonging to the  C-group.
The first question was (own translation): “The last tax reform changed the taxation 
of income from January 1, 2010. Imagine that you had earned a little extra income 
at the end of 2009. From a tax point of view, when would it be most beneficially for 
you to have the extra income paid out: (i) Just before January 1, 2010, or (ii) Just 
after January 1, 2010 or (iii) Equally beneficial.” For almost all taxpayers, it would be 
beneficial to receive the income after New Year because of the tax reform, although 
the incentive is modest for individuals in the control group as described above.
The second question was: “Do you perceive it to be legal or illegal for an employee 
to arrange with their employer to postpone the payout of some of the income earned 
in 2009 to 2010? (i) Legal or (ii) Illegal.”
Table 4 shows the distribution of answers across the treatment and control groups. 
Only about one-third of the taxpayers state it is most beneficial to obtain extra wage 
income after January 1, 2010, and most people state it is equally beneficial to get 
it before or after January 1. The share of individuals answering “after January 1” 
is nearly twice as big in the treatment group as in the control group. Nevertheless, 
only two out of five respondents in the treatment group were able to point out that 
it would be most beneficial to receive the extra payment after January 1. Around 
40 percent of the respondents stated they perceived it to be legal to postpone the 
payout of earned income from 2009 to 2010, and without any significant differences 
in the responses across the treatment group and the control group. Finally, if we 
define individuals to be aware of the shifting opportunity if they answer both “after 
January 1” and “legal,” then only 17 percent of the individuals in the treatment 
group are informed.
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In Figure A2 in the online Appendix, we analyze shifting behavior in the survey 
sample. First, we repeat the analysis in Figure 4 by plotting the evolution of the 
average value of the shifting indicator for the  T-group and the  C-group, respectively 
(panel A). With only 588 and 290 individuals in the two groups, the series become 
rather noisy, but January 2010 still has the largest spike and the difference between 
the  T-group and the  C-group is around 2.5 percent, which corresponds to our esti-
mates for the full population. We would expect the shifting effect to be driven by 
the informed part of the  T-group and the evidence also indicates that this is the case. 
When we redo the graphical analysis for the  T-group including only informed indi-
viduals, we see a clear spike at January 2010 with a 5.5 percentage point difference 
between the informed  T-group and the  C-group (panel B).
To conclude, the survey evidence suggests that awareness of the legal possibility 
and the financial gain has been an important factor in explaining why some employ-
ees are shifting income while others are not. This aligns with the point emphasized 
by Chetty, Loony, and Kroft (2009) that tax incentives need to be salient to actually 
affect consumer behavior. On the other hand, the extent of shifting among those 
who seem to be aware of the opportunity is not large, indicating that salience alone 
cannot explain why some taxpayers engage in shifting activity while many others 
do not.
III. Implications for Elasticity of Taxable Income
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is a key parameter in determining optimal 
tax policies. The excess burden of the tax system and the limits to redistribution (the 
Laffer rate) are governed by the income responses to taxation summarized by the 
ETI. For the design of optimal policies, the main interest is in the (long-run) ETI 
that may be used to compute the permanent tax distortions of a given tax structure.
Table 4— Share of Survey Answers on Shifting Awareness 
 Percent
All T-group C-group
Q1 = “Before 1st of January”   9   9  10
Q1 = “After 1st of January”  35  41  23
Q1 = “Equally beneficial”  56  51  67
Q2 = “Legal”  40  39  43
Q2 = “Illegal”  60  61  57
Q1 = “After 1st of January” & Q2 = “Legal”  15  17  11
Number of respondents 878 588 290
notes: The table reports answers to two questions on income shifting from survey respondents across treatment sta-
tus. The table is based on answers in a telephone survey of a random sample of the adult population and conducted 
for a group of researchers by the survey company Capacent Epinion in January 2011. The T-group consists of pri-
vate sector employees with average monthly wage income above DKK 35,000 in 2008 and positive wage income in 
2009 and 2010. The C-group consists of private sector employees with average monthly wage income in the range 
DKK 30,000–35,000 in 2008 and positive wage income in 2009 and 2010. 
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT) and telephone survey infor-
mation obtained by Capacent Epinion
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The transitory income movements due to income shifting may have implica-
tions for the estimation of the ETI that exploits  reform-driven variation in tax rates 
for identification (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012). If taxpayers temporarily shift 
income from a period with a high tax rate to a period with a low tax rate then this 
effect may enter into the empirical estimate, implying the estimated short run ETI is 
an upward biased estimate of the long run elasticity.
In this section, we exploit the monthly frequency of our data to identify in a new 
way the extent to which the short-run ETI may be attributed to income shifting 
responses. We start by deriving a traditional  difference-in-differences estimate of 
the ETI by estimating
(5)  w y, m, i =  β 0 +  β 1 d y, i 2010 +  β 2  d i T +  β 3  1 −  τ y, i _ 1 −  τ 2009, i +  ε y, m, i ,  
where  w y, m, i is defined in (1),  d y, i 2010 is a dummy variable that equals one in year 
2010,  d i T is a treatment dummy,  τ y, i is the tax rate applying to individual  i in year  y , 
and  ε y, m, i is an error term. This regression is estimated on values of  w y, m, i from 
January 2009 to December 2010 and with standard errors clustered at the individual 
level. In this specification,  β 3 corresponds to the ETI. To see this, note equations (1) 
and (5) imply
(6)  ETI =  
E [  z ̅2010, i −  z ̅2009, i   _ z ̅2008, i  | i ∈ T] − E [  z ̅2010, i −  z ̅2009, i   _ z ̅2008, i  | i ∈ c]      __________________________________ 
 ( 1 −  τ 2010 T  _1 −  τ 2009 T − 1) −  ( 1 −  τ 2010 
c  _
1 −  τ 2009 c − 1) 
 =  β 3 ,  
where the numerator is the percentage change in average monthly income of the 
 T-group from the year before the implementation of the reform to the year after 
implementation, and measured relative to the  C-group, while the denominator is the 
percentage change in the  net-of-tax rate of the  T-group due to the reform (18 percent) 
minus the corresponding change of the  C-group (2 percent) described in Section I.8
The  top-left corner of Table 5 reports the ETI estimate obtained from running 
regression (5). The ETI equals 0.1 and is very precisely estimated. The size of the 
elasticity is in line with recent empirical evidence for Denmark by Kleven and 
Schultz (2014) using yearly income data, spanning a period of 25 years with iden-
tifying variation provided by a series of tax reforms. In the rows  2–6 of column 1, 
we present the ETI estimate for different points in the income distribution, follow-
ing the income grouping applied in Figure 5. It shows that the ETI is increasing in 
income, as is also found in other studies (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012), and is 
equal to around 0.25 for the top 1 percent of the earners.
8 We measure the income differences relative to 2008 rather than 2009 income levels because the latter is 
influenced by the shifting behavior and in order to keep consistency with the remaining part of the analysis. The 
sensitivity analysis in Table A2 in the online Appendix shows that the ETI results are similar if we instead use 2009 
as the baseline year for the analysis. 
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In order to analyze how much of the ETI estimate that may be attributed to shift-
ing, we first recalculate the ETI using a subset of the data where we leave out indi-
viduals from the  T-group and the  C-group who are classified as shifters according 
to the shifting indicator in (3). This procedure removes only around 9,000 out of 
330,000 individuals from the sample but implies that the overall ETI estimate drops 
from 0.10 to 0.05. This result is reported in column 2 of Table 5. Looking at the 
effect through the income distribution in column 5, we see that the impact on the 
ETI estimate is largest at the top of the income distribution.
Another way to analyze the effect of shifting is to decompose the overall ETI esti-
mate into the variation coming from December 2009–January 2010, where income 
shifting is most prevalent, and the variation in the data coming from the remaining 
22 months. Column 3 of Table 1 displays the result from running the regression (5) 
on the subsample of  w -values from December 2009 and January 2010. It shows that 
the ETI estimate explodes to about 0.9, i.e., nine times as high as the basic estimate, 
and the effect is even more dramatic when going to the top of the income distribu-
tion where the elasticity estimate is above three.
If we assume that shifting only takes place in December and January, then we 
can remove shifting from the ETI estimate by basing the estimation on the remain-
ing 22 months. This gives an estimate equal to 0.03 (column 4). However, the evi-
dence in Section II, for example, Figure 3, shows that some individuals also shift 
their November 2009 income into 2010, and in column 5 we therefore also exclude 
November 2009 from the estimation. In that case, the point estimate of the ETI 
without shifting becomes 0.01, and it is statistically insignificant. These results sug-
gest that intertemporal income shifting, taking place very locally around the point 
of the implementation of the tax reform, is responsible for almost all the variation 
that is used for estimating the short-run ETI. Results align when we move through 
the income distribution. Many of the elasticity estimates in columns 4 and 5 are 
Table 5—Importance of Shifting for Estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income 
All months All months Only D09 & J10 Excl. D09 & J10 Excl. N09, D09, & J10
Income group All individuals Nonshifters All individuals All individuals All individuals
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample 0.10 (0.08, 0.11) 0.05 (0.03, 0.06) 0.86 (0.82, 0.89) 0.03 (0.01, 0.04) 0.01 (−0.00, 0.03)
income ≤ P80 0.01 (−0.01, 0.04) 0.00 (−0.02, 0.03) 0.16 (0.11, 0.22) 0.00 (−0.03, 0.03) −0.01 (−0.03, 0.02) 
P80 ≤ income < P90 0.06 (0.05, 0.08) 0.04 (0.02, 0.05) 0.48 (0.44, 0.53) 0.02 (0.01, 0.04) 0.02 (−0.00, 0.03)
P90 ≤ income < P95 0.12 (0.10, 0.14) 0.07 (0.05, 0.08) 0.89 (0.84, 0.94) 0.05 (0.03, 0.07) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05)
P95 ≤ income < P99 0.16 (0.14, 0.18) 0.06 (0.04, 0.08) 1.47 (1.40, 1.54) 0.04 (0.02, 0.06) 0.01 (−0.01, 0.03)
P99 ≤ income 0.26 (0.21, 0.31) 0.10 (0.05, 0.15) 3.17 (2.88, 3.47) −0.00 (−0.06, 0.05) −0.06 (−0.11, −0.01)
notes: The table reports ETI estimates using specification (5) and 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. The 
construction of the T-group (219,179) and the C-group (109,500) is described in the note to Figure 3. The column 
label “nonshifters” refers to estimations where employees shifting income around New Year 2010, according to 
the shifting criteria described in the note to Figure 4 and formula (3), are excluded from the sample. This excludes 
9,088 taxpayers from the total sample of 329,270 taxpayers. The ETI estimates under the column label “Only D09 
& J10” are based on estimation of (5) on the subsample of wage observations from December 2009 and January 
2010. The ETI estimates under the column label “Excl. D09 & J10” are based on estimation of (5) on a subsample 
where wage observations in December 2009 and January 2010 are excluded from the estimation. The ETI estimates 
under the column label “Excl. N09, D09, and J10” are computed by excluding wage observations in November 
2009, December 2009, and January 2010 from the estimation.
source: The monthly payroll (eIncome) register from the Danish tax authority (SKAT)
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 insignificant, and the point estimates indicate that income shifting explains at least 
half of the standard ETI estimate, and in some cases all of it. In particular, the high 
ETI estimates in the top of the income distribution can be explained entirely by 
intertemporal income shifting.
The standard  difference-in-differences approach relies on a strong assumption 
of a common trend of the  T-group and the  C-group. This assumption may be prob-
lematic, for example, because young wage earners have a more steep income profile 
and are more dominant in the control group. In Table A1 in the online Appendix, we 
repeat the ETI estimates in Table 5 but from a regression where we allow income 
growth to be explained by cohort dummies, gender, marital status, region dummies, 
industry type dummies, and firm size dummies (these controls and interactions with 
d y, i 2010 are added to the  right-hand side of the specification (5)). All the ETI estimates 
change only a little and the conclusions are therefore the same; this is also the case 
if we include only a subset of the control variables. Unobserved heterogeneity may 
still imply that top income individuals have experienced a different income devel-
opment than the control group, but the fact that top income shares have been almost 
constant for two decades in Denmark, unlike many other countries, indicates that 
this is not the case (Kleven and Schultz 2014).
A number of sensitivity analyses reported in Table A2 in the online Appendix 
show that the results are robust to changing the size of the control group, to chang-
ing the baseline year, and to the exclusion of all taxpayers in a band around the top 
tax threshold. The exclusion of taxpayers within an income range around the top 
tax threshold (the Doughnut sample) is a way to reduce the importance of mean 
reversion, which can lead to a downward bias in the ETI estimates. The estimates 
are largely unaffected suggesting that  mean-reversion is not a major concern for our 
overall ETI estimate.
It is common in the literature to look at  three-year income differences, using 
annual income in the year before the reform and annual income observed two years 
after the reform. The idea is that the use of a longer period may be better at over-
coming adjustment costs in  short-run  decision-making and thereby provide a better 
estimate of the long run ETI. This procedure also reduces the bias from income 
shifting because now it is only the year before the reform that is affected by shifting. 
The last row of Table A2 reports the results if we use data from 2011 (the last year in 
our data) instead of 2010 for our analysis, i.e., a  two-year window. In this case, the 
baseline ETI estimate drops from 0.10 to 0.08. As expected, the shifting component 
also becomes smaller, implying that the ETI estimates after controlling for shifting 
are now slightly higher and significant (although still rather small), but shifting may 
still account for more than half of the ETI estimates.
IV. Conclusion
Our results contribute in several ways to the empirical literature on the behavioral 
effects of taxation. First, using  high-frequency payroll data, we show that intertem-
poral income shifting is a significant issue for regular wage income and not only for 
more exotic types of compensation. Second, shifting may well account for all the 
income variation used to estimate the short-run ETI and may explain why estimates 
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are increasing with income. Third, shifting is widespread—it takes place at practi-
cally all levels of income and the extent of shifting is similar across industry sectors. 
Fourth, shifting is concentrated on very few individuals who shift large amounts. 
Fifth, the fact that only a few of the taxpayers with an incentive to shift income 
exploit the opportunity is probably related to unawareness of the potential benefits 
and legality of income shifting, and taxpayers being liquidity constrained as well as 
limited willingness of employers to cooperate with the employees in organizing this 
type of tax avoidance.
It is possible to engage in intertemporal income shifting by deferring payment 
of regular earnings or by postponing bonus payments. Our empirical approach cap-
tures both types of avoidance strategies but cannot distinguish between them. In 
an extension of this paper, we look more closely at  year-end tax planning of top 
managers and their choice of avoidance strategies (Kreiner,  Leth-Petersen, and Skov 
2014). The results show that income shifting is much more common among top 
managers who normally receive a  year-end bonus, and that they shift the bonus 
payment from December 2009 to January 2010 but do not defer payment of regular 
wage income.
Our finding of an ETI estimate close to zero after removing the shifting compo-
nent does not necessarily imply that the  long-run elasticity relevant for tax policy 
analyses is negligible. As shown in Chetty (2012), small frictions may imply that 
the long-run elasticity is of a considerable size, although the estimated short-run 
ETI is small or even zero. Consistent with this view, studies have found larger ETI 
estimates when considering a longer time horizon (e.g., Giertz 2010). Other types of 
evidence also point to a  nontrivial long-run elasticity, for example, the compelling 
 non-parametric evidence of longer run effects in Kleven and Schultz (2014) and 
the structural analysis of labor mobility in Kreiner, Munch, and  Whitta-Jacobsen 
(2015).
Our results indicate that information and salience is important for income shift-
ing, but our analysis cannot establish a causal relationship, as is done by Chetty, 
Loony, and Kroft (2009). Nevertheless, it is striking that we obtain reasonably large 
effects in a setting where only one out of five seems to be informed about the possi-
bility of income shifting. It is also remarkable that so few taxpayers engage in shift-
ing among those who seem to be informed. Our evidence points to the importance of 
liquidity constraints and firm cooperation but we cannot rule out other explanations, 
for example, tax moral and social norms.
Significant intertemporal shifting effects in wage income may have policy impli-
cations. For example, standard optimal tax theories call for age-dependency in tax 
rates (Banks and Diamond 2011), while the possibility of shifting, ceteris paribus, 
calls for constant marginal tax rates over the life cycle, which removes incentives to 
shift income payments across time. Evaluation of tax reforms normally focuses on 
the long-run effects. However, often a tax reform is replaced by a new reform a few 
years later, implying that income shifting effects are nontrivial in the long run. For 
example, the Danish 2010 tax reform studied in this paper was the sixth tax reform 
within a period of 25 years and 7 reforms were implemented in the United States 
in the 25 year period from 1980 to 2005. The individual benefits from shifting are 
very unequally distributed with large benefits in the top of the income  distribution, 
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and without any corresponding gain in economic efficiency.9 Thus, from a standard 
equality-efficiency trade-off perspective, social welfare would increase if income 
shifting is reduced.
In Denmark, it is possible to engage in intertemporal income shifting without 
breaking the tax law. This is not the case in all countries. For example, shifting of 
wage and salary income across years for the purpose of legal tax avoidance is not 
permitted in the United States, and intertemporal income shifting effects may there-
fore be less pronounced. On the other hand, the difference may not be large in prac-
tice as it is difficult for tax authorities to prove intertemporal income shifting has 
taken place when, say, a bonus payment is received in January instead of December.
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